Materialism differs from liberal humanism and hermeneutics in
the following ways:
1. Its concern is primarily one of critique and of finding the proper ground for it. "Put in other terms, for materialists, any view that is not self-consciously aware of its own critical position and import must be judged 'abstract' and irrelevant to human concerns. This especially applies to any view that begins from idealist assumptions, as do liberal humanism and hermeneutics." (According to Surber, these assumptions are "idealist" in the sense that they take the subject and its ideas as the starting point of cultural critique. Cf. 67.) [68]
2. The subject and its ideas are the product of more fundamental material forces. Thus, one's way of thinking (values, assumptions, interests, beliefs) are "ideological".
3. Materialist discourse functions as a critical aspect of the social sciences. [69]
4. Economic conditions take priority over the political or literary since they are closer to the level of cause than effect. "[T]he emphasis does not fall primarily on the politics of civil society and the rights of the individual, or on the understanding of texts and their meanings, but on the material processes by which human beings collectively produce the means by which their basic needs are met, reproduce themselves as a species, and configure their social arrangements in such a way that through the exchange of their productions, their basic material existence can be secured and enhanced." [69]
5. History plays a more salient role in materialist analyses. Human beings make their own history. Thus, the "underlying laws of history" are knowable. (Cf. Vico's claim that "what is true or knowable is what is created".) It is also assumed that humans can alter the course of history. [69]
[Note: Surber begins with a discussion of Cartesian dualism, idealism,
and rationalism, and contrasts this perspective with an emerging
monism, materialism, and empiricism. He argues that materialism,
in its "fully developed form" (i.e. in the work of Marx
and Engels), "differs dramatically" from liberal humanism
and hermeneutics. However, he doesn't explore fully enough the
purported "idealist assumptions" of liberal humanism.
This issue needs closer examination.] [67f]
During the 18th century a new scientific orientation arose, often
in opposition to the more abstract speculations of German, French,
and English philosophers. Naturalistic explanations of historical,
social, economic, and political phenomena were meant to replace
or, at least, mitigate the dualism of earlier thinkers. [70]
It was, however, at the turn of the century that idealism was raised to the most grandiose and comprehensive form in the writings of Hegel. Following Kant's notion that all knowledge is conceptual, Hegel argued that the "knowing subject" gains knowledge by ordering the chaos of sensation by means of universal concepts that precede experience. It is these universal concepts that constitute reality. [71]
"[A]ll knowledge arises from experience, which is the process of comprehending the particular in the universal....If experience is the process of comprehending what is more particular in terms of what is more general or universal, then experience must be progressive and cumulative, moving in the direction of ever higher conceptual generalities."
Hegel calls this process dialectic. The emphasis here is on reality as process rather than substance. It is a movement toward something higher and more abstract. "History, for Hegel, is thus the broad, dialectical process of the gradual unfolding of absolute knowledge over time." This was, in principle, a philosophical defense of Christian theology. [72]
The Young Hegelians (including Feuerbach and Marx) opposed Hegel's conservative arguments and defense of the status quo. In particular, Feuerbach attacked Hegel's
For Feuerbach, concrete, material, sensuous existence constitutes
our primary contact with reality. The perceived need for religion
was seen as a response to, and avoidance of, the difficulties
and contradictions that arise in material life. "The real
human problem is not to overcome contradictions in thought but
to alter those concrete conditions that give rise to otherworldly
impulses." [73] To avoid Hegel's idealist mystifications
of reality, Feuerbach used a transformational criticism
to reverse the order of idealist claims ("The Absolute is
the ground of the individual.") and, thereby, assert a corresponding
materialist thesis ("The individual gives rise to the concept.")
This was to have far-reaching effects in the work of Marx.
Marx tried to avoid the excessive abstractions of both Hegelian
idealism and scientific materialism by adopting Hegel's process-oriented
approach and applying it to a critical analysis of social and
economic reality in both its objective and subjective aspects.
[75]
Alienation [76] [See handout on historical materialism.]
Marxist critique must accomplish three things:
1. "[I]t must elucidate the dynamics of the structure of economic production existing at any given time, never failing to include in this the effects of the economic structure on participants." [81]
2. "[I]t must identify and demystify the principal ways in which the infrastructure is ideologically distorted by various social and cultural institutions and practices, not only laying bare their basis in material processes but showing how they serve at once to obscure and to reinforce the existing economic system."
3. It "must place this process of interaction between infrastructure and superstructure within the dialectical development of history itself, not only revealing that any existing configuration is itself contingent and hence alterable but indicating as well the direction in which the existing historical tensions and oppositions might be resolved."
Within the classical Marxist discourse, culture is seen as the
reflection in social practices of a particular mode of economic
production. In this sense it is always ideological. It
both obscures and reinforces existing economic relations.
Thus, critique must take on the task of undoing this mystification
and placing it in an historical context, thereby revealing its
contingent nature. [81]
Antonio Gramsci was particularly impressed by the resilience of
the modern state and its ability to control its subjects in spite
of their often deplorable economic circumstances. "What kept
the people from revolting against the dominance of the privileged
classes, when according to classical Marxist theory, all the necessary
conditions for revolution were present?" [86]
Gramsci also felt that the victory of fascist regimes over communist resistance in Europe had to be explained.
Gramsci introduced refinements and revisions of classical Marxist and Leninist discourses. He characterized the relationship between base and superstructure as a reciprocal relation rather than a determining (one way) relation. He also tried to develop a more sophisticated account of power which gave culture a more productive role.
Gramsci's analysis of modern societies drew attention to two types of power,
Gramsci's concept of hegemony differed from Marx's concept of ideology. [87]
Hegemony is not absolute. Thus, counterhegemonic forces arise which challenge the status quo and resist assimilation into the dominant culture. Thus, culture is seen as a site of ongoing power struggles among groups with different interests and values.
The role of the "organic intellectual" is to formulate theories that can be used to understand the forces at work in everyday life. Hegemonic intellectuals work to support the dominant culture, while counterhegemonic intellectuals offer resistance to it.
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© T. R. Quigley, 1998