The Visible and the Invisible: The Intertwining—The Chiasm

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

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Introduction by Thomas Baldwin

This chapter comes from a manuscript which was incomplete at Merleau-Ponty's death. In 1959 he converted his long-standing ambition to write a book about truth...into the project of a book about the visible and the invisible; in which he would move from a discussion of perception ('the visible') to one of language and thence truth ('the invisible'). The manuscript really addresses only the first part of this (though there are notes for the later parts); so it primarily represents his later thoughts about perception. In the first chapter Merleau-Ponty returns to his critique of realism and intellectualism. He then provides, in the second chapter, a decisive refutation of Sartre's Hegelian account in Being and Nothingness of our being in the world (see p. 29). In the third chapter he discusses critically Bergson's conception of 'intuition' and then begins to set out his own thoughts about temporality and language. But it is in the fourth chapter, reproduced here, that he breaks new ground.

The title of the chapter indicates his new conception of the body, as a 'chiasm' or crossing-over (the term comes from the Greek letter chi) which combines subjective experience and objective existence. His term for this new conception of the body is 'flesh' (chair) and he insists that it is an 'ultimate notion; a 'concrete emblem of a general manner of being; which provides access both to subjective experience and objective existence. The phenomenon he concentrates upon is one he had discussed earlier in The Phenomenology of Perception (pp 92 [106], that of touching one hand with the other hand. This phenomenon, he suggests, reveals to us the two dimensions of our 'flesh', that it is both a form of experience (tactile experience) and something that can be touched. It is both 'touching' and 'tangible': Furthermore the relationship is reversible: the hand that touches can be felt as touched, and vice versa, though never both at the same time, and it is this 'reversibility' that he picks out as the essence of flesh. It shows us the ambiguous status of our bodies as both subject and object. Thus Merleau-Ponty here qualifies his earlier view that gave priority to the 'phenomenal; subjective body over the objective body. For he now regards these as but two aspects of a single fundamental phenomenon: our reversible flesh' (the influence of Husserl is perhaps apparent here: in Ideas II he had affirmed that 'the Body as Body presents, like Janus, two faces', p. 297, though the 'faces' in question are not Merleau-Ponty's alternatives).

Merleau-Ponty extends the application of this conception in two directions. First, he extends it from touch to sight, which he now models on touch—"the look we said, envelops, palpates, espouses visible things: So sight has the same ambiguous nature as touch, and it is from its own 'objective' side that the objectivity of the visible world is generated". Second, taking the example of a handshake as exemplary, he extends his thesis to apply to our sense that others, like us, are both subjects and objects. Although these points are clear enough, and the chapter is not, as it stands, incomplete, it remains unclear how he intended to extend the line of thought further, since the manuscript ends at this point, and the notes that follow do not provide a connected discussion. Thus at this point there is a genuine sense of a thinker stopped in midair, and it is just not clear where the trajectory of his thought would have carried him. – TB
If it is true that as soon as philosophy declares itself to be reflection or coincidence it
prejudges what it will find, then once again it must recommence everything, reject the
instruments reflection and intuition had provided themselves, and install itself in a locus
where they have not yet been distinguished, in experiences that have not yet been
"worked over," that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both "subject" and "object," both
existence and essence, and hence give philosophy resources to redefine them. Seeing,
speaking, even thinking (with certain reservations, for as soon as we distinguish thought
from speaking absolutely we are already in the order of reflection), are experiences of
this kind, both irrecusable and enigmatic. They have a name in all languages, but a name
which in all of them also conveys significations in tufts, thickets of proper meanings and
figurative meanings, so that, unlike those of science, not one of these names clarifies by
attributing to what is named a circumscribed signification. Rather, they are the repeated
index, the insistent reminder of a mystery as familiar as it is unexplained, of a light which,
illuminating the rest, remains at its source in obscurity. If we could rediscover within the
exercise of seeing and speaking some of the living references that assign them such a
destiny in a language, perhaps they would teach us how to form our new instruments,
and first of all to understand our research, our interrogation, themselves.

The visible about us seems to rest in itself. It is as though our vision were formed in the
heart of the visible, or as though there were between it and us an intimacy as close as
between the sea and the strand. And yet it is not possible that we blend into it, nor that it
passes into us, for then the vision would vanish at the moment of formation, by
disappearance of the seer or of the visible. What there is then are not things first identical
with themselves, which would then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who
is first empty and who, afterward, would open himself to them—but something to which
we could not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we could not dream of
seeing all naked" because the gaze itself envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh.
Whence does it happen that in so doing it leaves them in their place, that the vision we
acquire of them seems to come from them, and that to be seen is for them but a
degradation of their eminent being? What is this talisman of color, this singular virtue of
the visible that makes it, held at the end of the gaze, nonetheless much more than a
quale

We must first understand that this red under my eyes is not, as is always said, a quale, a
pellicle of being without thickness, a message at the same time indecipherable and
evident, which one has or has not received, but of which, if one has received it, one
knows all there is to know, and of which in the end there is nothing to say. It requires a
focusing, however brief; it emerges from a less precise, more general redness, in which
my gaze was caught, into which it sank, before—as we put it so aptly -fixing it. And, now
that I have fixed it, if my eyes penetrate into it, into its fixed structure, or if they start to
wander round about again, the quale resumes its atmospheric existence. Its precise form
is bound up with a certain wooly, metallic, or porous configuration or texture, and the
quale

The color is yet a variant in another dimension of variation, that of its relations with the
surroundings: this red is what it is only by connecting up from its place with other reds
about it, with which it forms a constellation, or with other colors it dominates or that
dominate it, that it attracts or that attract it, that it repels or that repel it. In short, it is a
certain node in the woof of the simultaneous and the successive. It is a concretion of
visibility, it is not an atom. The red dress a fortiori holds with all its fibers onto the fabric of
the visible, and thereby onto a fabric of invisible being. A punctuation in the field of red
things, which includes the tiles of roof tops, the flags of gatekeepers and of the
Revolution, certain terrains near Aix or in Madagascar, it is also a punctuation in the field
of red garments, which includes, along with the dresses of women, robes of professors, bishops, and advocate generals, and also in the field of adornments and that of uniforms. And its red literally is not the same as it appears in one constellation or in the other, as the pure essence of the Revolution of 1917 precipitates in it, or that of the eternal feminine, or that of the public prosecutor, or that of the gypsies dressed like hussars who reigned twenty-five years ago over an inn on the Champs-Elysées. A certain red is also a fossil drawn up from the depths of imaginary worlds. If we took all these participations into account, we would recognize that a naked color, and in general a visible, is not a chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible being, offered all naked to a vision which could be only total or null, but is rather a sort of straits between exterior horizons and interior horizons ever gaping open, something that comes to touch lightly and makes diverse regions of the colored or visible world resound at the distances, a certain differentiation, an ephemeral modulation of this world—less a color or a thing, therefore, than a difference between things and colors, a momentary crystallization of colored being or of visibility. Between the alleged colors and visibles, we would find anew the tissue that lines them, sustains them, nourishes them, and which for its part is not a thing, but a possibility, a latency, and a flesh of things.

If we turn now to the seer, we will find that this is no analogy or vague comparison and must be taken literally. The look, we said, envelops, palpates, espouses the visible things. As though it were in a relation of pre-established harmony with them, as though it knew them before knowing them, it moves in its own way with its abrupt and imperious style, and yet the views taken are not desultory—I do not look at a chaos, but at things—so that finally one cannot say if it is the look or if it is the things that command. What is this prepossession of the visible, this art of interrogating it according to its own wishes, this inspired exegesis? We would perhaps find the answer in the tactile palpation where the questioner and the questioned are closer, and of which, after all, the palpation of the eye is a remarkable variant. How does it happen that I give to my hands, in particular, that degree, that rate, and that direction of movement that are capable of making me feel the textures of the sleek and the rough? Between the exploration and what it will teach me, between my movements and what I touch, there must exist some relationship by principle, some kinship, according to which they are not only, like the pseudopods of the amoeba, vague and ephemeral deformations of the corporeal space, but the initiation to and the opening upon a tactile world. This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also accessible from without, itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if it takes its place among the things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon a tangible being of which it is also a part. Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its own movements incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate, are recorded on the same map as it; the two systems are applied upon one another, as the two halves of an orange. It is no different for the vision—except, it is said, that here the exploration and the information it gathers do not belong "to the same sense." But this delimitation of the senses is crude. Already in the "touch" we have just found three distinct experiences which subtend one another, three dimensions which overlap but are distinct: a touching of the sleek and of the rough, a touching of the things—a passive sentiment of the body and of its space—and finally a veritable touching of the touch, when my right hand touches my left hand while it is palpating the things, where the "touching subject" passes over to the rank of the touched, descends into the things, such that the touch is formed in the midst of the world and as it were in the things. Between the massive sentiment I have of the sack in which I am enclosed, and the control from without that my hand exercises over my hand, there is as much difference as between the movements of my eyes and the changes they produce in the visible. And as, conversely, every experience of the visible has always been given to me within the context of the movements of the look, the visible spectacle belongs to the touch neither more nor less than do the "tactile qualities." We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, which is encrusted in it, as, conversely, the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not without visual
existence. Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the
same world. It is a marvel too little noticed that every movement of my eyes—even more,
every displacement of my body—has its place in the same visible universe that I itemize
and explore with them, as, conversely, every vision takes place somewhere in the tactile
space. There is double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the
tangible in the visible; the two maps are complete, and yet they do not merge into one.
The two parts are total parts and yet are not superposable.

Hence, without even entering into the implications proper to the seer and the visible, we
know that, since vision is a palpation with the look, it must also be inscribed in the order
of being that it discloses to us; he who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that
he looks at. As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision (as is so well indicated by the
double meaning of the word) be doubled with a complementary vision or with another
vision: myself seen from without, such as another would see me, installed in the midst of
the visible, occupied in considering it from a certain spot. For the moment we shall not
examine how far this identity of the seer and the visible goes, if we have a complete
experience of it, or if there is something missing, and what it is. It suffices for us for the
moment to note that he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by
it, unless he is of it,[2] unless, by principle, according to what is required by the
articulation of the look with the things, he is one of the visibles, capable, by a singular
reversal, of seeing them he who is one of them.[3]

We understand then why we see the things themselves, in their places, where they are,
according to their being which is indeed more than their being-perceived and why at the
same time we are separated from them by all the thickness of the look and of the body; it
is that this distance is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant with it, it is
synonymous with it. It is that the thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is
constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an
obstacle between them, it is their means of communication. It is for the same reason that
I am at the heart of the visible and that I am far from it: because it has thickness and is
thereby naturally destined to be seen by a body. What is indefinable in the quale,
in the

The body interposed is not itself a thing, an interstitial matter, a connective tissue, but a
sensible for itself, which means, not that absurdity: color that sees itself, surface that
touches itself—but this paradox [?]: a set of colors and surfaces inhabited by a touch, a
vision, hence an exemplar sensible, which offers to him who inhabits it and senses it the
wherewithal to sense everything that resembles himself on the outside, such that, caught
up in the tissue of the things, it draws it entirely to itself, incorporates it, and, with the
same movement, communicates to the things upon which it closes over that identity
without superposition, that difference without contradiction, that divergence between the
within and the without that constitutes its natal secret.[4] The body unites us directly with
the things through its own ontogenesis, by welding to one another the two outlines of
which it is made, its two laps: the sensible mass it is and the mass of the sensible
wherein it is born by segregation and upon which, as seer, it remains open. It is the body
and it alone, because it is a two-dimensional being, that can bring us to the things
themselves, which are themselves not flat beings but beings in depth, inaccessible to a
subject that would survey them from above, open to him alone that, if it be possible,
would coexist with them in the same world. When we speak of the flesh of the visible, we
do not mean to do anthropology, to describe a world covered over with all our own
projections, leaving aside what it can be under the human mask. Rather, we mean that
carnal being, as a being of depths, of several leaves or several faces, a being in latency,
and a presentation of a certain absence, is a prototype of Being, of which our body, the
sensible sentient, is a very remarkable variant, but whose constitutive paradox already
lies in every visible. For already the cube assembles within itself incompossible visibilia,
as my body is at once phenomenal body and objective body, and if finally it is, it, like my
body, is by a tour de force. What we call a visible is, we said, a quality pregnant with a
texture, the surface of a depth, a cross section upon a massive being, a grain or
 corpuscle borne by a wave of Being. Since the total visible is always behind, or after, or
between the aspects we see of it, there is access to it only through an experience which,
like it, is wholly outside of itself. It is thus, and not as the bearer of a knowing subject, that
our body commands the visible for us, but it does not explain it, does not clarify it, it only
concentrates the mystery of its scattered visibility; and it is indeed a paradox of Being, not
a paradox of man, that we are dealing with here. To be sure, one can reply that, between
the two "sides" of our body, the body as sensible and the body as sentient (what in the
past we called objective body and phenomenal body), rather than a spread, there is the
abyss that separates the In Itself from the For Itself. It is a problem—and we will not avoid
it to determine how the sensible sentient can also be thought. But here, seeking to form
our first concepts in such a way as to avoid the classical impasses, we do not have to
honor the difficulties that they may present when confronted with a cogito, which itself
has to be re-examined. Yes or no: do we have a body—that is, not a permanent object of
thought, but a flesh that suffers when it is wounded, hands that touch? We know: hands
do not suffice for touch—but to decide for this reason alone that our hands do not touch,
and to relegate them to the world of objects or of instruments, would be, in acquiescing to
the bifurcation of subject and object, to forego in advance the understanding of the
sensible and to deprive ourselves of its lights. We propose on the contrary to take it
literally to begin with. We say therefore that our body is a being of two leaves, from one
side a thing among things and otherwise what sees them and touches them; we say,
because it is evident, that it unites these two properties within itself, and its double
belongingness to the order of the "object" and to the order of the "subject" reveals to us
quite unexpected relations between the two orders. It cannot be by incomprehensible
accident that the body has this double reference; it teaches us that each calls for the
other. For if the body is a thing among things, it is so in a stronger and deeper sense than
they: in the sense that, we said, it is of them, and this means that it detaches itself upon
them, and, accordingly, detaches itself from them. It is not simply a thing seen in fact (I do
not see my back), it is visible by right, it falls under a vision that is both ineluctable and
defered. Conversely, if it touches and sees, this is not because it would have the visibles
before itself as objects: they are about it, they even enter into its enclosure, they are
within it, they line its looks and its hands inside and outside. If it touches them and sees
them, this is only because, being of their family, itself visible and tangible, it uses its own
being as a means to participate in theirs, because each of the two beings is an archetype
for the other, because the body belongs to the order of the things as the world is
universal flesh. One should not even say, as we did a moment ago, that the body is made
up of two leaves, of which one, that of the "sensible," is bound up with the rest of the
world.

There are not in it two leaves or two layers; fundamentally it is neither thing seen only nor
seer only, it is Visibility sometimes wandering and sometimes reassembled. And as such
it is not in the world, it does not detain its view of the world as within a private garden: it
sees the world itself, the world of everybody, and without having to leave "itself," because
it is wholly—because its hands, its eyes, are nothing else than this reference of a visible,
a tangible-standard to all those whose resemblance it bears and whose evidence it
gathers, by a magic that is the vision, the touch themselves. To speak of leaves or of
layers is still to flatten and to juxtapose, under the reflective gaze, what coexists in the
living and upright body. If one wants metaphors, it would be better to say that the body
sensed and the body sentient are as the obverse and the reverse, or again, as two
segments of one sole circular course which goes above from left to right and below from
right to left, but which is but one sole movement in its two phases. And everything said
about the sensed body pertains to the whole of the sensible of which it is a part, and to
the world. If the body is one sole body in its two phases, it incorporates into itself the
whole of the sensible and with the same movement incorporates itself into a "Sensible in
itself" We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer as in a box. Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh? Where in the body are we to put the seer, since evidently there is in the body only "shadows stuffed with organs," that is, more of the visible? The world seen is not "in" my body, and my body is not "in" the visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor is surrounded by it. A participation in and kinship with the visible, the vision neither envelops it nor is enveloped by it definitively. The superficial pellicle of the visible is only for my vision and for my body. But the depth beneath this surface contains my body and hence contains my vision. My body as a visible thing is contained within the full spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, and all the visibles with it. There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other. Or rather, if, as once again we must, we eschew the thinking by planes and perspectives, there are two circles, or two vortexes, or two spheres, concentric when I live naively, and as soon as I question myself, the one slightly centered with respect to the other....

We have to ask ourselves what exactly we have found with this strange adhesion of the seer and the visible. There is vision, touch, when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, or when between it and them, and through their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact—as upon two mirrors facing one another where two indefinite series of images set in one another arise which belong really to neither of the two surfaces, since each is only the rejoinder of the other, and which therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either of them. Thus since the seer is caught up in what he sees, it is still himself he sees: there is a fundamental narcissism of all vision. And thus, for the same reason, the vision he exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally passivity—which is the second and more profound sense of the narcissism: not to see in the outside, as the others see it, the contour of a body one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so that the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen. It is this Visibility, this generality of the Sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to Myself that we have previously called flesh, and one knows there is no name in traditional philosophy to designate it. The flesh is not matter, in the sense of corpuscles of being which would add up or continue on one another to form beings. Nor is the visible (the things as well as my own body) some "psychic" material that would be—God knows how—brought into being by the things factually existing and acting on my factual body. In general, it is not a fact or a sum of facts "material" or "spiritual." Nor is it a representation for a mind: a mind could not be captured by its own representations; it would rebel against this insertion into the visible which is essential to the seer. The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should need the old term "element," in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatiotemporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an "element" of Being. Not a fact or a sum of facts, and yet adherent to location and to the now. Much more: the inauguration of the where and the when, the possibility and exigency for the fact; in a word: facticity, what makes the fact be a fact. And, at the same time, what makes the facts have meaning, makes the fragmentary facts dispose themselves about "something." For if there is flesh, that is, if the hidden face of the cube radiates forth somewhere as well as does the face I have under my eyes, and coexists with it, and if I who see the cube also belong to the visible, I am visible from elsewhere, and if I and the cube are together caught up in one same "element" (should we say of the seer, or of the visible?), this cohesion, this visibility by principle, prevails over every momentary discordance. In advance every vision or very partial visible that would here definitively come to naught is not nullified (which would leave a gap in its place), but, what is better, it is replaced by a more exact vision and a more exact visible, according to
the principle of visibility, which, as though through a sort of abhorrence of a vacuum, already invokes the true vision and the true visible, not only as substitutes for their errors, but also as their explanation, their relative justification, so that they are, as Husserl says so aptly, not erased, but "crossed out."... Such are the extravagant consequences to which we are led when we take seriously, when we question, vision. And it is, to be sure, possible to refrain from doing so and to move on, but we would simply find again, confused, indistinct, non-clarified, scraps of this ontology of the visible mixed up with all our theories of knowledge, and in particular with those that serve, desultorily, as vehicles of science. We are, to be sure, not finished ruminating over them. Our concern in this preliminary outline was only to catch sight of this strange domain to which interrogation, properly so-called, gives access....