The terms glossed below are technical terms or idioms, most of which are more fully explained in the chapters of the book. Most are drawn, in translation, from Husserl’s texts; Husserl’s original German terms are included in parentheses, where appropriate. Some terms below are drawn not from Husserl, but from philosophical or historical discussions relevant to the chapters.

**abstraction** (Abstraktion) an intellectual operation whereby one abstracts from an object some essence of the object.

**abstract part** a moment, or dependent part, of an object.

**act** (Akt) an act of consciousness, a conscious experience; specifically, a consciousness of some object.

**adequacy** (Adäquatheit) a measure of evidence; evidence is adequate when complete, so that there are no sides or aspects of an object that are not presented with intuitive fullness; for Husserl, perception is always inadequate.

**adumbration** (Abschattung) a variation in the appearance of an object of perception; for example, the same color of an object appears with different adumbrations under different lighting conditions.

**analytic** (analytisch) a proposition is analytic if its truth is determined by its meaning or conceptual content alone; for example, “a bachelor is unmarried” is an analytic proposition; Husserl, with Bolzano, is concerned with analytic propositions whose truth is determined by their logical form.

**analytic philosophy** the tradition in 20th-century philosophy (and beyond) that focuses, narrowly, on analysis of concepts and language that play in philosophy, or, broadly, on analysis...
of theories and arguments – with historical roots in Frege, Russell, Carnap, and other philosophers who began with logic and worked into metaphysics, epistemology, etc.

**apodicticity** (*Apodiktizität*) a measure of evidence; a judgment or experience is apodictic if while having the experience one cannot doubt the existence of its object.

**apo phantic** (*apophantisch*) pertaining to judgment.

**a posteriori** a proposition is a posteriori if its truth can be known, or judged with evidence, only posterior to empirical observation or sensory perception; opposed to a priori.

**a priori** (*a priorisch*) a proposition is a priori if its truth can be known, or judged with evidence, prior to empirical observation or sensory perception; for Husserl, propositions in logic, in mathematics, and also in phenomenology are a priori.

**axiology** (*Axiologie*) the theory of good – a formal theory, for Husserl, applicable to values in different spheres.

**background** (*Hintergrund*) of an object of consciousness the range of properties and related objects lying in the background, or in the horizon, of an object of consciousness; for example, a perception presents an object against a background of further properties and objects; this structure of perceptual experience was emphasized by Gestalt psychologists influenced by Husserl, and by phenomenologists like Aron Gurwitsch and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

**background** (*Hintergrund*) of consciousness the ground of consciousness and its intentionality; the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) or life-world (*Lebenswelt*) on which the intentionality of consciousness depends.

**background sense** the sense of objects that is implicit or presupposed in everyday experience, which helps to define the horizon of an object of consciousness.

**body** the physical or corporeal body (*körper*) is the human body as a merely physical object; the lived or living body (*leib*) is the body, my body, as a living body in which I act.

**bracketing** (*Einklammerung*) the method or technique of turning our attention from the objects of our consciousness to our consciousness of those objects, thereby engaging in phenomenological
reflection; Husserl’s proposed method for the practice of phenomenology; also called epoché.

categorical imperative Kant’s basic ethical principle, “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”; Husserl uses the term “categorical imperative” more generally, for any basic ethical principle that serves as a ground norm for an ethical system, whence Husserl proposes to replace Kant’s principle with the formal principle “Do the better.”

category (Kategorie) a high-level form or formal essence of objects in general, such as the form Individual, Property, State of Affairs, Number, etc.; categories apply to objects in any material region such as Consciousness, Nature, or Culture.

certainty (Gewissheit) a measure of evidence; a judgment or experience is certain if one does not doubt the existence of its object.

cogito (Cogito) an act of consciousness; from Descartes’ use of the Latin “cogito,” meaning “I think.”

completeness, logical in logic, a property of certain theories; a deductive theory is complete if and only if all true propositions in the theory are deducible from the axioms in the theory – where truth is a semantic property and deducibility is defined by syntactic rules of inference.

concept (Begriff) a type of sense, specifically a sense that can be a grammatical or logical part of a proposition, expressible in language by a predicate.

consciousness (Bewusstsein) conscious experience, that is, an act of consciousness, such as an act of perception, imagination, thought, emotion, volition, etc.; alternatively, a subject’s stream of consciousness.

Consciousness (Bewusstsein) the material essence or region that encompasses acts of consciousness; here the term is capitalized when referring to the region.

constitution (Konstitution) the way an object is intended, hence “constituted,” in consciousness, where an object is intended through a manifold of meanings (sense) that present the same object as having various properties (species, qualities, relations) – for example, presenting possible properties of the
back side of an object presented in visual perception.

**constructivism** in ethics, the view that ethical or moral values are constructed, either through a process of practical reasoning about what to do or through choosing or willing what one will do, especially where one wills or reasons in an appropriate way (for example by following the Kantian categorical imperative).

**content** (Inhalt, Gehalt) the content of an act of consciousness, that is, “what” I experience as it is experienced or intended; an act’s real content, or noesis, is a temporal part (moment) of the act, whereas an act’s ideal content, or noema, is an ideal, nontemporal sense carried in the act by the noesis.

**continental philosophy** the tradition in 20th-century continental European philosophy (and its extensions elsewhere) informed originally by phenomenology in varying forms, featuring Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others who wrote in their wake; more broadly, the tradition shaped by Kant and extending through the 20th century as Husserl and successors developed versions of phenomenology or critiqued and sometimes rejected variants of phenomenology.

**culture** (Geist) the range of cultural or social objects, activities, and institutions, including moral values: cultural objects have a historical aspect; the German term “Geist” literally means “spirit” and is sometimes so translated, but Husserl’s usage emphasizes the social or cultural formation of “spirit.”

**Culture** (Geist) the material essence or region that encompasses cultural or social objects, activities, and institutions, including moral values; here the term is capitalized when referring to the region.

**dependence** (Unselbständigkeit) the ontological relation or condition where one object depends on another object, that is, where the one object could not exist unless the other object existed, according to the essences of the given objects; literally “non-self-standing-ness”; also called foundation or founding (Fundierung).

**eidetic variation** the technique of varying the properties of an object in imagination or phantasy, with the aim of judging which properties are essential to an object of that type, an object with its eidos or essence.
eidos (Eidos) the shareable essence of an object, including its ideal species, qualities, or relations; the Platonic form of an object, “eidos” in Greek.

empathy (Einfühlung) understanding the experience of another subject or I; literally, “feeling” my way “into” the experience of another I; for Husserl, empathy is basic to our activities in the surrounding cultural or social world; now commonly distinguished from sympathy, where I feel with the other, coming to have similar feelings.

empiricism the theory that knowledge is founded ultimately in sensory perception, which confers all basic evidence on our knowledge claims.

epistemology the theory of knowledge.

epoché (Epoché) Husserl’s basic method or technique for the practice of phenomenology; I bracket, or make no use of, the thesis of the existence of the world around me, and thereby I turn my regard or attention from objects in the world to my consciousness of objects in the world around me; adapting the Greek word “epoché,” meaning “to abstain”; also called bracketing.

essence (Wesen) what an object is, including its ideal species or type, qualities, and relations, also called its eidos; for Husserl, essences belong to a unique category; here the name of a particular essence is capitalized when its categorial status is relevant, for example, “Man” or “Tree” or “Eucalyptus.”

essential insight or intuition (Wesenserschauung, Wesenschau) intuitive comprehension of the essence of an object; also called eidetic intuition.

ethics the theory of moral values, of when an action is right or wrong, permissible or obligatory, praiseworthy or blame-worthy, etc.

evidence (Evidenz) intuitive or evidential support for judgments or knowledge claims, providing intuitive fulfillment; also, an act of intuition or (self-)evident experience.

experience (Erlebnis) an act of consciousness, a lived experience.

experience (Erfahrung) a cognitive experience, that is, an evident or intuitive experience, which can serve as the basis of further judgments that form knowledge.
expression (Ausdruck) a sign or syntactic construction in a language, including words, phrases, or sentences.

fact (Tatsache) in Husserl’s usage, any concrete, contingently existing object; specifically, an object in the region or category of Individual, the type of object that can have an essence – much as Aristotle defined particulars as what predicates are predicated of but what cannot be predicated of anything; distinguished from an existing state of affairs (Sachverhalt), for which some philosophers (following Bertrand Russell) have used the English term “fact.”

feeling ethics (Gefühlethik) the ethical theory holding that an action is morally right just in case it carries appropriate feeling for others, or sympathy; promoted by David Hume, now called sentimentalist ethics, in English-language writers.

form (Form) a type of essence or eidos, namely a formal essence.

formal essence that type of essence which can be instantiated by objects in different material regions such as Nature, Consciousness, and Culture (Geist); formal essences include, for example, the forms Object, Individual, Property, Relation, State of Affairs, Number.

formal logic that part of logic, or logical theory, which depends only on the logical form of expressions or their meanings, thus the formal theory of signs or symbols in a language, including the theory of relations of inference or logical consequence among sentences or propositions, insofar as these relations are definable in purely formal terms; Husserl distinguished formal logic from transcendental logic.

formal ontology that part of ontology which deals with forms or formal essences, as distinct from material essences; formal ontology studies ontological forms such as Object, Individual, Property, Relation, State of Affairs, Number.

formal versus material a distinction Husserl applies at different levels, namely to expressions, to meanings, and to objects.

formalization the intellectual activity of moving from objects to their forms or formal essences; Husserl distinguishes formalization from generalization.

foundation (Fundierung) dependence, where one object depends on another object just in case the one object could not exist unless
the other object existed, according to the essences of the given objects.

**Geist** the German term that can mean mind or spirit, including *Zeitgeist*, or spirit of the times; Husserl uses the term to mean the material region of cultural objectivities, including social institutions and moralities; the term can be translated directly as “spirit,” but is translated here as “culture,” since “spirit” carries different connotations in English (as the spirit is said to leave the body at death).

**generalization** the intellectual activity of moving from objects to their species or higher material essences; Husserl distinguishes generalization from formalization.

**geometry, Euclidean** the mathematical theory of space, originated by Euclid with his five axioms, where, in particular, parallel lines never meet.

**geometry, non-Euclidean** a mathematical theory of space with different properties than Euclidean space (for example like the surface of a sphere or of a saddle, in two such theories).

**ground** (*Grund*) that on which an object depends or is founded, specifically for its existence.

**ground norm** (*Grundnorm*) the norm or principle that defines what counts as a value in a given domain of values (for example moral values or aesthetic values).

**horizon** (*Horizont*) the range of possibilities left open for an object of consciousness, for example possible properties of the back side of an object as I see it and possible relations of the object to other objects; the horizon of an act of consciousness configures the object of consciousness as having possible properties and relations beyond those explicitly presented in the act, properties compatible with the content or noematic sense of the act.

**horizon, inner** that part of the horizon of an object of consciousness which includes possible further properties of the object, such as the size or color of the back side of an object of vision.

**horizon, outer** that part of the horizon of an object of consciousness which includes possible further relations of the object to other objects, such as the relation of an object of vision to objects behind it, say, objects that are not currently visible.
human being (Mensch) a member of the human species, a psychophysical natural object, with a living body (Leib), falling under the region Nature.

hyle (Hyle) the sensory part of a perceptual experience; also called hyletic data, or sense data, or sensory data; for Husserl, the real, temporal part (moment) of a perceptual experience that involves sensation and is given meaning or sense by noesis; from the Greek “hyle,” meaning “matter,” thus the “matter” of perception, which gains “form” through noesis.

hyletic data (hyletische Daten) the data of sensation, such as seeing colors or shapes, also called “sensory data” or “sense data”; the manifold of hyletic or sensory data in a perception form the hyle in the perceptual experience, where the hyle are given sense by noesis.

I (Ich) a subject of consciousness; the pure I, abstracted from its embedment in nature and culture; sometimes translated as “ego,” but Husserl usually uses just the first-person pronoun “Ich.”

implicit sense a sense that concerns an object of consciousness but is only implicit, not explicit, in the intentional content of the relevant act of consciousness intending the object.

independence (Selbständigkeit) the condition where an object does not depend for its existence on the existence of some other object; literally “self-standing.”

individual (Individuum) a particular object, which can have essences, that is, species, qualities, or relations.

Individual (Individuum) the formal category encompassing individuals; here capitalized when referring to the category, as opposed to objects falling under the category.

intention (Intention, Meinen, Vermeinen) an intentional act of consciousness, intending some object in some way.

intentional object an object as intended in an act of consciousness; Husserl occasionally uses this traditional term as equivalent with the noematic sense of an act, or the object as intended, distinguished from the object which is intended.

intentionality (Intentionalität) the directedness of consciousness toward an object; an act of consciousness is a consciousness of something, and in that sense it is intentional.
**intentionality, secondary** in time-consciousness, one’s secondary consciousness of one’s primary consciousness of some object; the act is thus primarily directed toward its object while secondarily directed toward itself – this form of consciousness toward itself Husserl analyzes in the structure of time-consciousness.

**intersubjectivity** (Intersubjektivität) the interaction of different subjects in the surrounding world, especially in our collective “constitution” of objects in nature or in culture; alternatively, the availability of objects to different subjects, especially the property of being perceivable or knowable by different subjects in different forms of consciousness, for example where different subjects can see the same object from different perspectives.

**introspection** inner inspection of one’s conscious experiences, a technique used in empirical psychology in the late 19th century; Husserl distinguished phenomenological reflection from classical introspection.

**intuition** (Anschauung) direct, self-evident experience; empirical intuition is sensory perception of things and events in space and time, eidetic intuition is comprehension of essences (especially as achieved by eidetic variation), phenomenological intuition is reflection on the structure or content of consciousness as lived or experienced from the first-person perspective (especially as practiced by bracketing or epoché).

**intuitive fullness** (Fülle, Erfüllung) the character of evidence, or self-evidence, with which an object is “itself” given in intuition, or “bodily present.”

**judgment** (Urteil) an act of judging that such-and-such, positing the existence of the state of affairs judged; knowledge is formed when judgments are supported by intuitive evidence.

**Kantian ethics** the ethical theory, propounded by Immanuel Kant, holding that an action is morally right or obligatory just in case it accords with the principle Kant called the categorical imperative, “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”

**kinesthetic experience** consciousness of one’s own body (Leib) and one’s volitional bodily movement; related to what psychologists call proprioception, or body-awareness.
**language** a system of signs or expressions, with a grammar and semantics and practice, such as English or German; also, a mathematically defined language such as that of geometry, calculus, etc.

**Lebenswelt** the life-world, the world of everyday life, the surrounding world as experienced in everyday life; the German term is itself now sometimes used in popular writing.

**life-world** (Lebenswelt) the surrounding world as experienced in everyday life, including “spiritual” or cultural, that is, social, activities.

**logic** the study of valid inference; for Husserl, logic also includes what has since been called semantics, studying correlations between expressions, their meanings, and the types of object expressions represent by virtue of their meanings.

**logical positivism** or **logical empiricism** a movement in 20th-century philosophy, centered in the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 1930s, holding that all knowledge is based in sensory experience (positivism, empiricism) and is structured or expressed precisely in the language of modern logic (logical) – featuring Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and others.

**manifold** (Mannigfaltigkeit) a structured many-ness, a complex structure consisting (we may say today) of a set of objects together with a set of relations that may hold among those objects; Husserl borrowed the term from non-Euclidean geometries, and logicians later called such a structure a model (following Tarski).

**mathematization** when Husserl worried about the “mathematization” of nature, he meant the ontological assumption that the essence of natural occurrences is identical with (and exhausted by) the mathematical structures used, for example, in mathematical physics to calculate forces, motions, etc.

**mathesis universalis** the ideal of a universal mathematical language or calculus, a formal language representing, according to Husserl, the formal categorial structures of the world; Husserl borrows the term from Leibniz, and the notion traces to early geometers.

**meaning** (Bedeutung) the meaning of an expression, a meaning expressible by an expression in a language; Husserl holds that
an expression expresses as its meaning a sense that is the intentional content of an appropriate underlying act of consciousness, though sense may be modified through its expression as meaning.

**metaethics** that part of ethical theory which concerns the nature of ethics, the status of moral values, etc.

**metalogic** in mathematical logic, the theory of symbolic languages and their logical properties, including what can be proved, represented, etc., in a given symbolic language; the details of metalogic were developing in Husserl’s day, for example, in the work of his colleague David Hilbert, but many of the most famous results were developed after Husserl’s time.

**metatheory** the theory of theories (Husserl’s idiom), which would include metalogic (in mathematical logic) but also, in Husserl’s conception of pure logic, simply the philosophical theory of how theories (systems of propositions) represent things in the world, drawing on Husserl’s theory of intentionality.

**mind** all types of mental or psychic states or activities, including conscious experiences and (if so theorized) unconscious mental states; the German term “Geist” has different meanings, as in *Zeitgeist*, and Husserl generally talks of “psychic” states or of consciousness.

**modality (Modalität) of being** a mode or way of being for an object, specifically possibility or necessity or impossibility or (in some ontologies) actuality, especially as these apply to states of affairs; in modal logic these modalities are represented by the modal operators or sentence-modifiers “possibly_” and “necessarily_”; Jaakko Hintikka developed a variety of modal logic that treats the sentence-modifiers “a believes that_,” “a perceives that_,” etc. as modal operators.

**modality (Modalität) of judgment** a mode or way of positing an object in an act of judgment, for example with belief, with doubt, with certainty, etc.

**modalizing (Modalizierung)** varying the modality of a judgment, say, as one acquires further evidence concerning what is judged or judged about.
**moment** (Moment) a dependent part of an object, that is, a part that cannot exist unless the object exists; thus, an object that depends on another object for its existence; specifically, what Aristotle called an “accident” of a substance, for example this whiteness in this white vase; what some recent philosophers have called a “trope.”

**motivation** (Motivation) a relation of evidential support offering some degree of probability; one experience or belief motivates another just in case the former provides intuitive evidence for the probability of the existence of the object posited in the latter; for example where a perception motivates a judgment about the existence of a presented object or state of affairs.

**motivated possibility** (motivierte Möglichkeit) a possibility for an object of experience or judgment where that possibility is motivated or rendered appropriately probable by prior experience or by relevant background beliefs; for example, when I see a table, the possibility that it has ten legs is not a motivated possibility, whereas the possibility that it has four or three legs is a motivated possibility.

**nature** (Natur) the range of objects and events and properties that occur in space–time and have causal properties.

**Nature** (Natur) the material essence or region that encompasses objects and events and properties that occur in space–time and have causal properties, that is, the region of objects in nature; here the term is capitalized when referring to the region.

**noema** the ideal content of an act of consciousness, including (1) the noematic sense embodying the way the object is intended, for example as a particular object “X” having such-and-such properties or “predicates,” and (2) the thetic character of the act, that is, whether perceiving, imagining, or judging, etc.

**noematic quotation** a technique of phenomenological bracketing; by “quoting” the noema of an act of consciousness, we turn our regard or attention from the object of consciousness (prescribed by the act’s noema) to the noema “quoted” (which prescribes the object).

**noematic sense** the component or part of an act’s noema which embodies the way (“how,” or “Wie”) the object is intended,
that is, as thus-and-so, as a particular object ("X") bearing certain properties ("predicates").

noesis the real content of an act of consciousness, "in" which the ideal content or noema occurs or is realized; the noetic part or moment of an act of consciousness, the part that consists in the act’s intending or presenting an object in some way, a part that occurs in time, as does the act itself.

norm (Norm) any value, in a sphere or domain of values.

object (Gegenstand, Objekt) any entity of any kind or category; Husserl sometimes speaks of “objectivity” (Gegenständlichkeit), covering any complex type of object; also, any object of consciousness.

objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit or Objektivität) the property of being an object, especially a potential object of consciousness; alternatively, the property of knowledge or judgment that is properly formed or grounded in evidence or intuition.

ontology (Ontologie) the theory of what there is, and perhaps the ways objects exist (for example in space–time or not).

other I (anderes Ich) another subject.

part (Teil) a part of some object; a dependent part or moment (Moment) of an object cannot exist apart from the object, as, for example, this white in that white object; an independent part or piece (Stück) of an object can exist apart from the object, as, for example, the wheel of a bicycle.

person (Person) an individual in a social or cultural community, subject to moral values, in the life-world.

phenomena (Phänomene) in common usage, whatever occurs; in the original Greek, appearances, or what appears to us; in Kant’s philosophy, things as they appear, that is, as they appear to us, especially in our forms of cognition defining space and time; in Husserl’s phenomenology, objects as we experience them, what we experience, “the things themselves” – thus, in a technical sense, the domain of study in phenomenology.

phenomenological psychology the study of acts of consciousness (per phenomenology) as realized in nature (per psychology).

phenomenology (Phänomenologie) the theory or study of consciousness as lived or experienced from the first-person perspective;
especially, focusing on pure consciousness and its characteristic intentionality, its structure in the stream of consciousness, etc.

**philosophy of language** the philosophical theory of language, addressing reference, sense, truth, speech acts, etc.

**philosophy of mathematics** the philosophical theory of the nature of mathematics and mathematical objects.

**philosophy of mind** the philosophical theory of the nature of mind; especially the tradition in analytic philosophy that addresses, in particular, approaches to the mind–body problem.

**philosophy of science** the philosophical theory of the structure, aims, and methods of the various sciences, especially the natural sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, and empirical psychology; for Husserl, in effect, the theory of sciences in the widest sense, including mathematics, logic, phenomenology, as well as the natural sciences.

**piece** (Stück) a part of an object that can exist independently of the object.

**Platonism** in ontology, the doctrine that ideal objects such as forms or essences or numbers are not spatiotemporal and can exist independently of concrete, spatiotemporal objects that instantiate them; in logical theory, Platonism holds that logic concerns ideal meanings, including propositions and concepts, and the relations between such meanings, notably relations where one proposition logically entails another proposition.

**positivism** (Positivismus) the doctrine, popular in 19th-century philosophy, holding that all knowledge is modeled on the empirical or “positive” sciences, especially physics, chemistry, etc.; logical positivism specified further that knowledge claims should be not only founded in sensory perception, according to empiricism and positivism, but also expressed in a logically precise language, such as the new logic of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, following Frege, Peano, Whitehead and Russell, et al.

**practique** (Praktik) the theory of practice; a formal theory, for Husserl, applicable to different ranges of practice, especially in the theory of values.

**pre-predicative experience** a form of experience prior to predication; especially, seeing an individual, on the basis of which
one may form a predicative judgment that the perceived object has certain properties.

**predicative experience** an experience such as judgment in which a property is predicated of an object, or a relation is predicated of two or more objects.

**primary impression** in time-consciousness, the current phase of perceptual experience, which consists in a sensory impression (for example of the present tone in a melody) that is joined with retentions (of just-past tones just heard) and protentions (of anticipated just-about-to-be-heard tones).

**(pro)position** (Satz) Husserl uses the term “Satz” sometimes to mean proposition (a form of sense or Sinn) and other times, in one specialized use, to mean the position taken toward an object in an act of consciousness; a proposition is the noematic sense of an act of, say, judging that such-and-such, whereas a position in this sense is the noematic thetic character of the act plus the noematic sense.

**proposition** (Satz) the type of sense that serves as the content of an act of thinking or judging that such-and-such; the same term is also used for sentences in a language.

**protention** (Protention) in time-consciousness, the immediate anticipation in current experience of the just-about-to-occur phases of experience and of their objects; for example, in hearing a melody, the protention of anticipated imminent tones while hearing the current tone; counterpart of retention.

**psyche** the mind, especially taken as an aspect of an animate organism in nature; for Husserl, the psyche is studied in psychology, whereas pure consciousness is studied in phenomenology.

**psychologism** the view that logic (and thus mathematics) is a matter of empirical psychology, specifying how we happen to reason.

**pure consciousness** consciousness in abstraction from its realization in nature and culture; the region of pure consciousness is the proper domain of phenomenology.

**pure ethics** formed ethics, which governs substantive or material ethics; a form of metaethics.
pure I (ego) (reines Ich) I, the subject of an act of consciousness, the enduring subject of the experiences in the unified stream of consciousness; the subject in abstraction from his or her body in nature and role in culture, thus restricted to the aspect (part or moment) of oneself as playing the role of subject of consciousness.

pure logic logic, or logical theory, restricted to the study of ideal meanings or senses and their logical powers; for Husserl, pure logic is the theory of theories, where a theory is an ideal system of propositions; specifically, for Husserl, pure logic studies the forms or categories of expressions, the forms or categories of meanings, the forms or categories of objects, and the logical (= semantic) correlations among expressions, meanings, and objects, for example the correlations among sentences, the propositions they express, and the states of affairs these propositions represent.

pure phenomenology transcendental phenomenology; opposed to phenomenological psychology; pure phenomenology studies pure consciousness, that is, acts of consciousness in abstraction from their realization in nature and culture; pure phenomenology is practiced by the method of bracketing.

rationalism the theory that knowledge is founded ultimately in reason, which confers all basic evidence on our knowledge claims, even justifying reliance on sensory perception.

reduction, ontological the ontological doctrine that one kind of object reduces to another, for example that mental events or conscious experiences reduce to, or are fundamentally identical with, physical events in a brain.

reduction, phenomenological (Reduktion) Husserl’s technique for practicing phenomenological reflection on conscious experience: also called bracketing or epoché; sometimes called transcendental reduction.

region (Region) a material essence or domain of objects with a certain range of essences; Husserl recognizes three such regions, namely Nature, Consciousness, and Culture (Geist).

relativity theory the theory in physics, launched by Albert Einstein, which holds (roughly) that matter and energy are defined in a system of space–time so that the mass, velocity, etc. of material objects are relative to that framework.
retention (Retention) in time-consciousness, the retaining in
current experience of the just-past phases of experience and of
their objects; for example, in hearing a melody, the retention
of just-heard past tones while hearing the current tone; coun-
terpart of protention.

semantics that part of logic (or linguistics) that concerns
meaning, including the roles of meanings in reference and truth; after Husserl’s day, logical theory was divided into
syntax, concerning the form of expressions, semantics,
concerning the sense or meaning of expressions, and pragmatics,
concerning the use of expressions.

sensation (Empfindung) the temporal (partial) experience of sensing
colors, shapes, sounds, etc.; for Husserl, sensation is a dependent
part (moment) of a perceptual experience, which is given
sense in the noesis, also a dependent part of the perceptual experience.

sense (Sinn) the ideal intentional content of an act of conscious-
ness, prescribing what is experienced as it is experienced;
Husserl also refers to the sense in an act as “the object as intended,” distinguished from the object which is intended.

sense data (Sinnesdaten) or sensory data (Empfindungsdaten) the data of
sensation, such as seeing colors or shapes, also called “hyletic
data”; for Husserl, the real, temporal part of a perceptual expe-
rience that involves sensation and is given meaning or sense by
noesis.

skepticism the epistemological doctrine that we cannot know
such-and-such for certain; at the extreme, holding that we can
never know anything, that is, with certainty.

solipsism the ontological doctrine that there exists only one thing,
the self or mind, so that all objects are merely ideas in my mind.

space (Raum) the realm of spatial relations among things in nature,
described mathematically by an appropriate system of geom-
etry.

species (Spezies) an ideal kind or type to which an object may
belong.

state of affairs (Sachverhalt) a structured object consisting of an
individual having a property or essence, or two or more indi-
iduals standing in a relation; literally, “things related”; for
Husserl, a state of affairs is the type of object that serves as the
object of a judgment, and is represented by a proposition (Satz),
the type of sense that serves as the noematic sense of an act of
judgment.

**State of Affairs** (*Sachverhalt*) the formal category encompassing
states of affairs; here capitalized when referring to the category,
as opposed to objects falling under the category.

**stream of consciousness** (*Bewusstseinsstrom*) or **stream of experi-
ence** (*Erlebnisstrom*) the temporally structured flow (stream) of
experiences or acts of consciousness; the term originated with
William James, whom Husserl had read.

**subject** (*Subjekt*) an I (ego), the subject of an act of consciousness,
that is, the being or object who plays this role in consciousness,
thus in the relation of intentionality; for Husserl, to be a subject
is to play this role in intentionality, not to be a purely mental
substance (per Descartes) or a thinking organism (per biology)
or a political subject (per political theory).

**subjectivity** (*Subjektivität*) the property of consciousness where it is
experienced or lived through or performed by a subject, an I.

**substrate** (*Substrat*) an object that bears properties or essences, and
so plays the role of individual in states of affairs, but is not
itself an essence or higher-order object; for Husserl, a formal
category akin to Aristotle’s category Primary Substance, whence
species, qualities, and relations are predicated of substrates but
substrates are not predicated of anything.

**surrounding world** (*Umwelt*) the world around me or us as expe-
rienced in everyday life; equivalent with the life-world (*Lebenswelt*).

**syntax** that part of logic which concerns the form of expressions
in a given language.

**syntactical objectivity** a complex object, such as a state of affairs
“syntactically” formed from simpler objects such as individuals
and properties; Husserl thus uses the term “syntactic” to apply
not only to the forms of expressions, but also to the forms of
complex objects represented by complex expressions.

**synthesis** (*Synthese*) the form of “constitution” wherein objects of
different types are intentionally put together or synthesized as
objects of consciousness; for Husserl, both active and passive
synthesis is at work in the “constitution” of a given type of
object of consciousness – by contrast, for Kant, the under-
standing synthesizes the products of sensibility by applying
concepts to form cognitions of objects, especially objects in space
and/or time.

**synthetic** a proposition is synthetic if its truth is not determined
by its meaning or conceptual content alone; for example, “the
moon revolves around the Earth” is a synthetic proposition.

**systematicity** the way a theory or philosophy hangs together
systematically, as its parts are interdependent; Husserl’s philos-
ophy hangs together in such a way, though he does not use this
term explicitly.

**theory** (Theorie) for Husserl, a theory is an ideal system of propo-
sitions that are connected by relations of logical consequence
(in an ideally complete axiom system) and concern objects in a
specified domain, that is, the domain of objects represented by
concepts or propositions in the theory.

**theory of science** (Wissenschaftslehre) or **theory of theories** the theory
of what counts as a theory (Theorie) or a proper science
(Wissenschaft); for Husserl, pure logic is the theory of theories or
of sciences.

**thetic character** (thetischer Charakter) or **positing character** (Setzung-
Charakter) the ideal character of an act of consciousness including
its species (perception, imagination, judgment, etc.) and modi-
fications of certainty or probability, intuitive fullness, clarity,
attentiveness, etc., thus including its character of “positionality”
(Posizionalität) or “position” (Satz, as distinct from propositional
sense, also Satz), that is, the character of positing an object in the
way appropriate to an act of perception or judgment or imagi-
nation, etc., and with appropriate modifications thereof; for
Husserl, an act’s noema divides fundamentally into a thetic
character and a sense (Sinn).

**thing** (Ding) an object in space (and time), thus in nature.

**time-consciousness** (Zeitbewusstein) consciousness of the flow of time.

**time-consciousness, inner** consciousness of the temporal flow of
experiences in the stream of consciousness.
time-consciousness, outer or objective consciousness of the temporal flow of things or events in space–time, that is, in nature.

transcendence (Transzendenz) lying beyond complete knowledge or intention; for example, a physical thing can be perceived from only one side at a time, and so its full essence is transcendent – there is always more to come, further properties that could be known or intended in further experiences of the same object.

transcendental a philosophical term whose exact meaning varies; Husserl uses the term to apply to aspects of consciousness, pure consciousness in abstraction from its connection with natural or cultural objects or activities; Kant used the term in reference to the necessary conditions of the possibility of cognition; Medieval European philosophers used it for the most universal of properties, including being and unity.

transcendental idealism Husserl’s doctrine that all objects are in principle objects of possible consciousness, capable in principle of being intended through some appropriate meanings or noemata, and in that way relative to consciousness; Kant introduced the term for his doctrine that space and time are forms of our cognition, whence objects in space and time are phenomenal rather than noumenal, and so are relative to our forms of cognition.

transcendental logic logic, or logical theory, that is grounded in transcendental phenomenology, specifically in the theory of intentionality; for Husserl, formal logic addresses only the formal structure of expressions in a language and relations of inference or consequence that depend on form alone, whereas transcendental logic addresses the sense or meaning of expressions in the language, specifically where these meanings are drawn from the contents of intentional acts of consciousness, and so (in today’s terms) transcendental logic includes semantics based in the theory of intentionality.

transcendental phenomenology that type of phenomenology which stresses the pure or transcendental structure of consciousness, in abstraction from its realization in nature and culture; in his middle and later works, Husserl stressed the transcendental conception of phenomenology, especially where practiced by the method of bracketing or epoché.
transcendental philosophy for Husserl, philosophy grounded in transcendental phenomenology; Kant introduced the term to mean philosophy that seeks the necessary conditions of the possibility of knowledge.

transcendental reflection phenomenological reflection, especially as practiced through bracketing or epoché.

truth (Wahrheit) the correlation of a sentence or proposition or judgment to the world; specifically, for Husserl, a proposition is true just in case it represents an existing state of affairs.

truth definition in logic, a formal specification of the conditions of truth for syntactical forms of sentence in a given language; this mathematical semantic conception of truth was introduced by Alfred Tarski in the 1930s and has become a standard form for the basic semantics of a language.

Umwelt the surrounding world, as experienced in everyday life; Husserl used this term in early works for what he came to call the life-world (Lebenswelt).

utilitarianism the ethical theory holding that an action is morally right just in case it promotes the greatest utility, either the greatest balance of pleasure over pain or the greatest happiness or well-being.

value (Wert) any value in a given sphere or domain (for example aesthetic or moral values).

Value (Wert) here capitalized when referring to the ontological category that encompasses values of all kind: Husserl assumes a distinct formal essence or category for values.

ways of givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) the variety of thetic characters in an act of consciousness, for example perceptual or imaginative givenness, intuitive fullness, clarity, attentiveness, etc.

world (Welt) everything that is; for Husserl, the structure of the world would be elaborated in terms of formal essences or categories, applied to objects in material regions.

X or the determinable X a component of the noematic sense of an act of consciousness; the determinable X prescribes the object itself, in abstraction from all predicates or properties of the object as intended.