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My academic studies began in the winter of 1909–10 in theology at the University of Freiburg. But the chief work for the study in theology still left enough time for philosophy which belonged to the curriculum anyhow. Thus both volumes of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* lay on my desk in the theological seminary ever since my first semester there. These volumes belonged to the university library. The date due could be easily renewed again and again. The work was obviously of little interest to the students. But how did it get into this environment so foreign to it?

I had learned from many references in philosophical periodicals that Husserl’s thought was determined by Franz Brentano. Ever since 1907, Brentano’s dissertation “On the manifold meaning of being since Aristotle” (1862) had been the chief help and guide of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy. The following question concerned me in a quite vague manner: If being is predicated in manifold meanings, then what is its leading fundamental meaning? What does Being mean? In the last year of my stay at the Gymnasium, I stumbled upon the book of Carl Braig, then professor for dogmatics at Freiburg University; “On Being. Outline of Ontology.” It had been published in 1896 at the time when he was an associate professor at Freiburg’s theological faculty. The larger sections of the work give extensive text passages from Aristotle, Thomas of Aquinas and Suarez, always at the end, and in addition the etymology for fundamental ontological concepts.

From Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, I expected a decisive aid in the questions stimulated by Brentano’s dissertation. Yet my efforts were in vain because I was not searching in the right way. I realized this only very much later. Still, I remained so fascinated by Husserl’s work that I read in it again and again in the years to follow without gaining sufficient insight into what fascinated me. The spell emanating from the work extended to the outer appearance of the sentence structure and the title page. On that title page I encountered the name of the publisher Max Niemeyer. This encounter is before my eyes as vividly today as then. His name was connected with that of “Phenomenology,” then foreign to me, which appears in the subtitle of the second volume. My understanding of the term “phenomenology” was just as limited and vacillating as my knowledge in those years of the publisher Max Niemeyer and his work. Why and how both

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names – Niemeyer Publishing House and Phenomenology – belong together would soon become clearer.

After four semesters I gave up my theological studies and dedicated myself entirely to philosophy. I still attended theological lectures in the years following 1911, Carl Braig’s lecture course on dogmatics. My interest in speculative theology led me to do this, above all the penetrating kind of thinking which this teacher concretely demonstrated in every lecture hour. On a few walks when I was allowed to accompany him, I first heard of Schelling’s and Hegel’s significance for speculative theology as distinguished from the dogmatic system of Scholasticism. Thus the tension between ontology and speculative theology as the structure of metaphysics entered the field of my search.

Yet at times this realm faded to the background compared with that which Heinrich Rickert: treated in his seminars: the two writings of his pupil Emil Lask who was killed as a simple soldier on the Galician front in 1915. Rickert dedicated the third fully revised edition of his work The Object of Knowledge, Introduction to Transcendental Philosophy, which was published the same year, “to my dear friend.” The dedication was supposed to testify to the teacher’s benefit derived from this pupil. Both of Emil Lask’s writings – The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories. A Study of the Dominant Realm of Logical Form (1911) and The Doctrine of Judgment (1912) – themselves showed clearly enough the influence of Husserl’s Logical Investigations.

These circumstances forced me to delve into Husserl’s work anew. However, my repeated beginning also remained unsatisfactory, because I couldn’t get over a main difficulty. It concerned the simple question how thinking’s manner of procedure which called itself “phenomenology” was to be carried out. What worried me about this question came from the ambiguity which Husserl’s work showed at first glance.

The first volume of the work, published in 1900, brings the refutation of psychology in logic by showing that the doctrine of thought and knowledge cannot be based on psychology. In contrast, the second volume, which was published the following year and was three times as long, contains the description of the acts of consciousness essential for the constitution of knowledge. So it is a psychology after all. What else is section 9 of the fifth investigation concerning “The Meaning of Brentano’s Delimitation of ‘psychical phenomena’”? Accordingly, Husserl falls back with his phenomenological description of the phenomena of consciousness into the position of psychology which he had just refuted. But if such a gross error cannot be attributed to Husserl’s work, then what is the phenomenological description of the acts of consciousness? Wherein does what is peculiar to phenomenology consist if it is neither logic nor psychology? Does a quite new discipline of philosophy appear here, even one with its own rank and precedence?

I could not disentangle these questions. I remained without knowing what to do or where to go. I could hardly even formulate the questions with the clarity in which they are expressed here.

The year 1913 brought an answer. The Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Investigation which Husserl edited began to be published by the publisher Max Niemeyer. The first volume begins with Husserl’s treatise Ideas. “Pure phenomenology” is the “fundamental science” of philosophy which is characterized by that phenomenology. “Pure” means: “transcendental phenomenology.” However, the “subjectivity” of the knowing, acting and valuing subject is posited as “transcendental.” Both terms, “subjectivity” and “transcendental,” show that “phenomenology” consciously and ideally moved into the tradition of modern philosophy but in such a way that “transcendental subjectivity” attains a more original and universal determination through phenomenology. Phenomenology retained “experiences of consciousness” as its thematic realm, but now in the systematically planned and secured investigation of the structure of acts of experience together with the investigation of the objects experienced in those acts with regard to their objectivity.

In this universal project for a phenomenological philosophy, the Logical Investigations, too – which had to speak remained philosophically neutral – could be assigned their systematic place. They were published in the same year (1913) in a second edition by the same publisher. Most of the investigations had in the meantime undergone “profound revisions.” The sixth investigation, “the most important with regard to phenomenology” (preface to the second edition) was, however, withheld. But the essay “Philosophy as Exact Science” (1910–11) which Husserl contributed to the first volume of the new journal Logos also only now acquired a sufficient basis for its programmatical theses through the Ideas.

In virtue of these publications, Niemeyer’s work attained the foremost rank of philosophical publishers. At that time the rather obvious idea was current that with “phenomenology” a new school had arisen in European philosophy. Who could have denied the correctness of this statement?

But such historical calculation did not comprehend what had happened in virtue of “phenomenology,” that is, already with the Logical Investigations. This remained unspoken, and can hardly even be rightly expressed today. Husserl’s own programmatical explanations and methodological presentations rather strengthened the misunderstanding that through “phenomenology” a beginning of philosophy was claimed which denied all previous thinking.

Even after the Ideas was published, I was still captivated by the never-ceasing spell of the Logical Investigations. That magic brought about anew an unrest unaware of its own reason, although it made one suspect that it came from the inability to attain the act of philosophical thinking called “phenomenology” simply by reading the philosophical literature.

My perplexity decreased slowly, my confusion dissolved laboriously, only after I met Husserl personally in his workshop.

Husserl came to Freiburg in 1916 as Heinrich Rickert’s successor. Rickert had taken over Windelband’s chair in Heidelberg. Husserl’s teaching took place in the form of a step-by-step training in phenomenalistic “seeing” which at the same time demanded that one relinquish the untested use of philosophical knowledge. But it also demanded that one give up introducing the authority of the great thinkers into the conversation. However, the clearer it became to me that the increasing familiarity with phenomenalistic seeing was fruitful for the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing, the less I could separate myself from Aristotle and the other Greek thinkers. Of course I could not immediately see what decisive consequences my renewed occupation with Aristotle was to have.

As I myself practiced phenomenalistic seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed
Now I had to submit my closely protected work to the public. On account of Husserl’s intervention, the publishing house Max Niemeyer was ready to print immediately the first fifteen proof sheets of the work which was to appear in Husserl’s Jahrbuch. Two copies of the finished page proofs were sent to the ministry by the faculty right away. But after some time, they were returned to the faculty with the remark: “Inadequate.” In February of the following year (1927), the complete text of Being and Time was published in the eighth volume of the Jahrbuch and as a separate publication. After that the ministry reversed its negative judgment half a year later and made the offer for the chair.

On the occasion of the strange publication of Being and Time, I came first into direct relationship with the publishing house Max Niemeyer. What was a mere name on the title page of Husserl’s fascinating work during the first semester of my academic studies became evident now and in the future in all the thoroughness and reliability, generosity and simplicity, of publication work.

In the summer of 1928, during my last semester in Marburg, the Festschrift for Husserl’s seventieth birthday was in preparation. At the beginning of this semester Max Scheler died unexpectedly. He was one of the co-editors of Husserl’s Jahrbuch where he published his great investigation Formalism in Ethics and Material Ethics of Value in the first and second volume (1916). Along with Husserl’s Ideas, it must count as the most significant contribution to the Jahrbuch. Through its far-reaching effects, it placed the scope and effectiveness of the Niemeyer publishing house in a new light.

The Festschrift for Edmund Husserl appeared punctually for his birthday as a supplement to the Jahrbuch. I had the honor of presenting it to the celebrated teacher within a circle of his pupils and friends on April 8, 1929.

During the following decade all more extensive publications were withheld until the publishing house Niemeyer dared to print my interpretation of Hölderlin’s hymn “As on a Holiday” in 1941 without giving the year of publication. I had given this lecture in May of the same year as a public guest lecture at the university of Leipzig. The owner of the publishing house, Mr. Hermann Niemeyer, had come from Halle to hear this lecture. Afterward we discussed the publication.

When I decided twelve years later to publish earlier lecture series, I chose the Niemeyer publishing house for this purpose. It no longer bore the designation “Halle a.d. Saale.” Following great losses and manifold difficulties, and visited by hard personal suffering, the present owner had re-established the firm in Tübingen.

“Halle a.d. Saale” – in the same city, the former Privatdozent Edmund Husserl taught during the ‘90s of the last century at that university. Later in Freiburg, he often told the story of how the Logical Investigations came to be. He never forgot to remember the Max Niemeyer publishing house with gratitude and admiration, the house which took upon itself the venture of publishing, at the turn of the century, an extensive work of a little-known instructor who went his own new ways and thus had to estrange contemporary philosophy, which ignored the work for years after its appearance, until Wilhelm Dilthey recognized its significance. The publishing house could not know at that time that his name would remain tied to that of phenomenology in the future, that phenomenology would soon determine the spirit of the age in the most various realms – mostly in a tacit manner.
And today? The age of phenomenological philosophy seems to be over. It is already taken as something past which is only recorded historically along with other schools of philosophy. But in what is most its own, phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility of thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, of corresponding to the claim of what is to be thought. If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it can disappear as a designation in favor of the matter of thinking whose manifestness remains a mystery.

**Supplement 1969**

In the sense of the last sentence, one can already read in *Being and Time* (1927) pp. 62–63: “Its (phenomenology’s) essential character does not consist in being actual as a philosophical school. Higher than actuality stands possibility. The comprehension of phenomenology consists solely in grasping it as possibility.”

**2 THE FUNDAMENTAL DISCOVERIES OF PHENOMENOLOGY, ITS PRINCIPLE, AND THE CLARIFICATION OF ITS NAME**

We shall detail these discoveries and then supplement this account with an elucidation of the principle of phenomenological research. On this basis we shall try to interpret the name given to this research and thus define ‘phenomenology.’

Of the decisive discoveries, we intend to discuss three: 1) *intentionality*, 2) *categorical intuition*, and 3) the *original sense of the apriori*. These considerations are indispensable in their content as well as in the way it is considered. Only in this way can ‘time’ be brought into view phenomenologically. Only in this way is the possibility given for an orderly procedure in the analysis of time as it shows itself.

**§5 Intentionality**

We want to consider intentionality first, precisely because contemporary philosophy then and even now actually finds this phenomenon offensive, because intentionality is precisely what prevents an immediate and unprejudiced reception of what phenomenology wants to do. Intentionality was already alluded to in our account of how Brentano sought to classify the totality of psychic phenomena in strict accord with it. Brentano discerned in intentionality the structure which constitutes the true nature of a psychic phenomenon. Intentionality thus became for him the criterion for the distinction of psychic from physical phenomena. But at the same time this structure is the criterion and principle of a natural division among psychic phenomena themselves, inasmuch as it is already found in the essence which appears in these phenomena. Brentano expressly emphasizes that he is only taking up what Aristotle and the Scholastics were already acquainted with. It was through Brentano that Husserl learned to see intentionality.

But by what right do we then still speak of the discovery of intentionality by phenomenology? Because there is a difference between the rough and ready acquaintance with a structure and the understanding of its inherent sense and its implications, from which we derive the possibilities and horizons of an investigation directed toward it in a strict way. From a rough acquaintance and an